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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most controversial statutory provision in Florida's cap-
ital sentencing scheme is the provision permitting a judge to override a
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and impose the death
penalty.' Only three other states permit jury overrides in capital
* An editorialist recently posed the question, "Who, if anyone, should be trusted to take
a human life? One judge, or a jury of 12 citizens?" Eroding the Role of Juries, ST. PaTE. TnIas,
Apr. 22, 1995, at A16.
** Assistant United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. B.A., 1989, Univer-
sity of Florida; J.D., 1992, Stetson University. Former law clerk to the Honorable John H.
Moore II, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
1. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1995) ("Notwithstanding the recommendation of a major-
ity of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall
enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death .... "). Although this provision authorizes, and
was originally intended to permit, the judge to override a jury's recommendation of death and
impose a life sentence, the controversy surrounding the statute centers on the overwhelming
number of cases in which the judge has overridden a recommendation of life imprisonment and
imposed a sentence of death.
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sentencing; 2 for the most part, their statutes are modeled after Flori-
da's trifurcated capital sentencing scheme.' For more than a decade,
legal critics have asserted that the jury override violates the United
States Constitution, the Florida Constitution, and public policy.
4
However, the United States Supreme Court continues to uphold the
validity of the jury override.'
To understand the importance of the jury override, consider the
Raleigh Porter case. On March 1, 1995, Florida Governor Lawton
Chiles signed a death warrant for Raleigh Porter, whom a jury had
convicted on two counts of first degree murder in 1978 for beating
and strangling a retired elderly couple. 6 Despite the jury's unanimous
recommendation of life imprisonment, the trial judge imposed a sen-
tence of death.7 Although Porter was scheduled to die at 7:00 A.M. on
March 29, 1995, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted a last
minute stay of execution.8 The court found that Porter had produced
reliable evidence of the trial judge's fixed predisposition to sentence
him to death if the jury convicted him.9 Whatever Raleigh Porter's
2. These states are Alabama, Delaware, and Indiana. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1994); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (West 1995).
3. United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has said: "Florida has adopted
an unusual 'trifurcated' procedure for identifying the persons convicted of a capital felony who
shall be sentenced to death. It consists of a determination of guilt or innocence by the jury, an
advisory sentence by the jury, and an actual sentence by the trial judge." Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 470 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4. See, e.g., Michael A. Mello, The Jurisdiction To Do Justice: Florida's Jury Override
and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 927-38 (1991) [hereinafter Mello, Juris-
diction To Do Justice]; Michael A. Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Uncon-
stitutionality of Capital Statutes That Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury,
30 B.C. L. REv. 283, 286-90 (1989) [hereinafter Mello, Taking Caldwell Seriously]; Michael
Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life In
Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 35-40 (1985) [hereinafter Mello & Robson, Judge Over
Jury].
5. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995) (upholding the constitutionality of
Alabama's capital sentencing scheme).
6. See Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 555 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 532
(1994); Porter v. State, 400 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1981).
7. Porter, 14 F.3d at 555-56; Florida Inmate To Die March 29, 1995; Jury Unanimously
Says Life; Judge and Governor Say Death, Hus. WnmE, Mar. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires file [hereinafter Florida Inmate To Die].
8. See Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483 (1 1th Cir. 1995); see also Florida Inmate To Die,
supra note 7.
9. Porter, 49 F.3d at 1489. Remarks the trial judge allegedly made to the clerk of the court
during trial, as well as more recent remarks to the media, suggest that he was predisposed to
sentence Porter to death before the penalty proceedings began:
The Clerk stated that either before or during Porter's trial, the judge presiding over
the case, the Honorable Richard M. Stanley, stopped by the Clerk's Office early one
morning, and the judge and the Clerk drank coffee together. The judge stated that he
had changed the venue in the Porter trial from Charlotte County to Glades County
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eventual fate, the recent stay of execution illustrates the controversy
over whether it is wise to empower the judiciary with the discretion to
override a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.' 0
United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has charac-
terized the imposition of the death penalty as "not a legal but an ethi-
cal judgment-an assessment of . . . the moral guilt of a
defendant."" A sentence of death, Justice William J. Brennan has
said, is "truly an awesome punishment . . . [involving], by its very
nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity."' 2 While a pris-
oner retains "the right to have rights" and remains "a member of the
human family," the imposition of a death sentence is "a way of say-
ing, 'You are not fit for this world, take your chance elsewhere.' ""
Whether to impose the death penalty is, without doubt, the single
most important decision made in the criminal justice system.
The question, then, is whom should society entrust with the heavy
burden of making this ultimate ethical judgment? Theoretically, the
right should be vested in the community as represented by individual
jurors." However, under Florida's capital sentencing scheme, the
because there had been a lot of publicity and Glades County "had good, fair minded
people here who would listen and consider the evidence and then convict the son-of-a-
bitch. Then, Judge Stanley said, he would send Porter to the chair."
Id. at 1487.
10. The history of the case involving Joseph "Crazy Joe" Spaziano is also instructive. See
infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text. On June 15, 1995, Governor Chiles stayed the sched-
uled June 27 execution of Joseph "Crazy Joe" Spaziano for an "indefinite period of time." See
Chiles Blocks Spaziano Execution, Pending Study, FLA. Tntas-UNoN, June 16, 1995, at BI.
Governor Chiles entered the stay to allow an investigation into the reliability of testimony given
against Spaziano by a key prosecution witness under hypnosis. Id. Although Governor Chiles
subsequently signed Spaziano's death warrant, the Florida Supreme Court granted Spaziano an
indefinite stay of execution on September 12, 1995, and remanded the case to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing. See Spaziano v. State, 660 So. 3d 1363, 1365-66 (Fla. 1995). Spaziano
was convicted of first degree murder in 1976 for the 1973 killing of Orlando nurse Laura Har-
berts. See Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); see also
James Kilpatrick, Is Florida About To Execute an Innocent Man?, FLA. Tts-UNioN, June 8,
1995, at A17. Notwithstanding a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, the trial judge sen-
tenced Spaziano to death. Spaziano, 433 So. 2d at 510.
11. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citation omitted).
12. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
13. Id. (citation omitted). In contrast to a life sentence, where punishment is revocable,
with a death sentence, the executed person loses the right to have rights and the finality of death
precludes relief. Id.
14. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("A jury verdict expresses a collective judgment that we may fairly pre-
sume to reflect the considered view of the community."); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461 (restating
petitioner's argument that "[slince the jury serves as the voice of the community, the jury is in
the best position to decide whether a particular crime is so heinous that the community's re-
sponse must be death").
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ultimate power to impose this awesome punishment is vested in a sin-
gle judge, not a twelve-member jury. 5 Governor Chiles has stated
that, when it comes to this important decision, "I trust jurors. I trust
them if they vote for mercy or for death.' 1 6 Why, then, does the Flor-
ida Legislature preserve a system placing this trust in a single elected
official?
This Article examines Florida's trifurcated capital sentencing
scheme, specifically the jury override provision, from its origin to the
present. Part II examines the enactment of the jury override in the
context of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia. 7 Part II also illustrates the procedural application of the
jury override and reviews its judicial interpretation by both the Flor-
ida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Part III
identifies and analyzes several criticisms of Florida's jury override
provision. Part IV examines the potential impact of Florida Commit-
tee Substitute for House Bill 1319, which would have given the trial
judge sole capital sentencing authority, and which Governor Chiles
vetoed on June 14, 1995.18 Finally, this Article concludes that the
Governor's veto was appropriate because Florida's jury override pro-
vision represents a valuable balance between the judge and the jury;
the provision thus ensures substantial reliability in the state's capital
sentencing scheme.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the existing
death penalty statutes of several states in the landmark decision Fur-
man v. Georgia. 9 The Supreme Court has since engaged in the sys-
tematic practice of "deregulating death"' 2 by essentially leaving "it to
the states to administer their capital statutes as they see fit."', In 1976,
the Court laid the framework for this deregulation by holding that the
15. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1995).
16. State Ponders Changing Steps to Execution, MiAmi HERALD, Mar. 3. 1991, at 6B; see
also This Death Penalty Bill Tramples on Morality, PALm BC. POST, May 26, 1995, at 14A
[hereinafter Bill Tramples on Morality].
17. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that then-existing death penalty statutes con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
18. See Fla. CS for HB 1319 (1995); Veto of Fla. CS for HB 1319 (1995) (letter from Gov.
Chiles to Sec'y of State Sandra B. Mortham, June 14, 1995) (on file with Sec'y of State, the
Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Governor's Veto]; see also Chiles Vetoes Jury Recom-
mendation Bill, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 15, 1995, at BS.
19. See 408 U.S. at 239-40.
20. Robert Weisberg originated the phrase "deregulating death." See Robert Weisberg, De-
regulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 305.
21. Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 932.
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newly created capital sentencing schemes of Florida, Georgia, and
Texas complied with the dictates of Furman and thus passed constitu-
tional muster.2 2 In 1984, the Supreme Court "made [it] clear" that
there is no single right way to set up a state capital sentencing
scheme 3.2 Finally, in 1995, the Supreme Court solidified its view that it
is not the Court's responsibility to second-guess such statutory
schemes enacted by states. 24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court chose,
within the parameters of Furman, to defer to the states in regard to
regulation of capital sentencing.
A. Furman v. Georgia and Florida's Death Penalty Statute
The Furman Court in striking down the death penalty statutes of
Georgia and Texas, held that they constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 2' Although subse-
quent decisions have held that capital punishment is not per se
violative of either the United States Constitution26 or the Florida Con-
stitution, 27 courts have interpreted Furman as requiring all capital sen-
tencing schemes to be "reasonable and controlled, rather than
capricious and discriminatory. ' 2 In essence, Furman mandates that a
state's capital sentencing scheme must provide clear guidelines pre-
cluding the arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death pen-
alty and thus affording a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
' 29
22. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
23. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984).
24. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1035 (1995).
25. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). The Eighth Amendment
reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Florida Supreme Court has said that
"[tihis is the only controlling law which Furman v. Georgia ... provides, as no more specific
statement of the law could garner a majority of the members of the high court." State v. Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). Each of the five justices constitut-
ing the Furman majority wrote a separate opinion. See 408 U.S. at 238. Justice John Paul Stev-
ens later reasoned that "[plunishment may be 'cruel and unusual' because of its barbarity or
because it is 'excessive' or 'disproportionate' to the offense." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 477 (Stev-
ens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. SeeGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
27. See Raulerson v. State, 358 So. 2d 826, 829 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
28. Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 7 ("[I1f the judicial discretion possible and necessary under [the
capital sentencing scheme] can be shown to be reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious
and discriminatory, the test of Furman v. Georgia has been met."); see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188
("Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner.").
29. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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Furman's practical effect was to invalidate capital sentencing
schemes which the Supreme Court considered arbitrary and capri-
cious. One such scheme was Florida's "mercy statute,"30 under which
a death sentence was mandatory upon conviction of a capital felony
unless the jury specifically voted for mercy." Pursuant to Florida's
"mercy statute," which had been in effect for more than a century
prior to Furman, the fate of a capital defendant was solely within the
"complete and unbridled" province of a majority of the jury-unless,
of course, the defendant chose to waive trial by jury.32 Furthermore,
although the statute entitled all convicted capital defendants to a di-
rect appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, judicial review "was lim-
ited to the question of guilt or innocence and not the question of
punishment. '33 Because of the procedure's arbitrary and unbridled
nature, Furman effectively invalidated Florida's mercy statute.
3 4
The Florida Legislature enacted the current capital sentencing
scheme in 1972, complying with Furman by providing capital defen-
dants with more judicial protection. 5 Upon conviction or adjudica-
tion of guilt of a capital offense,3 6 the trial court conducts a separate
sentencing hearing before the jury to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.3 7 During this hear-
ing, the trial judge must permit the introduction of any relevant evi-
dence regarding the nature of the crime and the defendant's
character.3" The jury must then consider the aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances and provide the trial judge with an advisory sen-
tence. 9 Irrespective of the jury's recommended sentence, the trial
30. Florida's pre-Furman capital sentencing scheme was codified at FLA. STAT. § 755.082(1)
(1971).
31. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1,6 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). If the
jury recommended mercy, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. For a lengthy
list of post-Furman per curiam opinions which invalidated unexecuted death sentences imposed
under Florida's "mercy statute," see id. at 6 n.2.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id.
34. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
35. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294-95 (1977); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
247 (1976); Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 13. The United States Supreme Court has described Florida's
capital sentencing scheme as "patterned in large part on the Model Penal Code." Proffitt, 428
U.S. at 248.
36. Florida law presently provides for two capital offenses: first degree murder and throw-
ing or discharging any destructive device that results in the death of another person. FLA. STAT.
§§ 782.04(l)(a), 790.161(4) (1995).
37. Id. § 921.141(1). If the capital defendant has waived jury trial, the trial court must
impanel a jury for the sole purpose of providing an advisory sentence. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 921.141(l)-(2). The advisory sentence should inform the trial judge of the jury's
determination as to whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist, whether sufficient
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judge must independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances and determine the appropriate sentence. 0
Immediately after the Florida Legislature enacted the new sentenc-
ing scheme, the Florida Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in
State v. Dixon.41 The court enumerated five procedural steps which
the statute provided to the defendant between conviction and the im-
position of the death penalty: 1) reserving the issue of punishment for
a separate post-conviction sentencing hearing; 2) empowering the jury
to provide the judge with an advisory sentence; 3) requiring the judge
to impose an independent sentence guided by the jury's advisory sen-
tence; 4) mandating that the trial court justify a sentence of death in
writing; and 5) providing immediate judicial review of a death sen-
tence by the Florida Supreme Court.42 The court found that these
steps provided "concrete safeguards beyond those of the trial system
to protect [the defendant] from death where a less harsh punishment
might be sufficient. ' 43 Noting, in addition, that the death penalty was
not per se unconstitutional, the Dixon court upheld Florida's capital
sentencing scheme as "reasonable and controlled, rather than capri-
cious and discriminatory.' '"
The United States Supreme Court also approved Florida's capital
sentencing scheme in Proffitt v. Florida.45 Upholding both the sta-
tute's facial constitutionality as well as its specific application to the
instant case, the Court noted that the jury's role is only advisory and
that the actual sentence is determined by the trial judge.46 Thoroughly
analyzing the procedural application of the statutory scheme's
safeguards, it found that "[o]n their face [they] appear to meet the
mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist, and
whether, based upon these circumstances, the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment. Id. § 921.141(2).
40. Id. § 921.141(3). The Florida Supreme Court presumes that a sentence of death is ap-
propriate when there is at least one aggravating circumstance, unless "overridden by one or
more of the mitigating circumstances." State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943 (1974).
41. 283 So. 2d 1 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
42. Id. at 7-8. In addition, the defendant is permitted to present any relevant mitigating
evidence at the separate sentencing hearing. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977).
Although aggravating circumstances are limited to those specifically enumerated in the statute,
the defendant may present both statutory and non-statutory mitigating evidence. See Miller v.
State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979).
43. Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 7.
44. Id. at 7. The Dixon court, interpreting Furman, rejected the argument that mere pres-
ence of discretion in the sentencing procedure rendered it unconstitutional. Id. at 6. The court
noted that it is "the quality of discretion and the manner in which it was applied that dictated
the rule of law which constitutes Furman v. Georgia." Id.
45. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
46. Id. at 253-59.
1995]
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constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. '47 Furthermore, the
Court noted that, while jury sentencing in capital cases served an im-
portant societal function, it was not constitutionally required.4 Thus,
the Proffitt Court tacitly approved of vesting the power to make the
ultimate ethical judgment in the judiciary.4 9
B. The Jury Override and the Tedder Standard
The importance of the jury override provision in Florida did not
come into focus until the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Tedder
v. State.50 In Tedder, the defendant was convicted of first degree mur-
der and the jury, after a second trial for sentencing, returned a recom-
mended sentence of life imprisonment. Based upon a finding of three
aggravating circumstances and none in mitigation, the trial judge
overrode the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and im-
posed a sentence of death. 2 Upon immediate appeal, the Florida Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court's decision and announced what
has come to be known as the Tedder standard: under Florida's trifur-
cated death penalty statute, the trial judge must afford "great
weight" to a jury's recommendation and cannot override a jury's rec-
ommendation of life unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death
are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ.""
In Spaziano v. Florida,54 the United States Supreme Court finally
addressed the issue of whether a state can vest capital sentencing au-
thority in the judiciary. When Joseph "Crazy Joe" Spaziano was
convicted of first degree murder in 1976, the jury rendered an
47. Id.at251.
48. Id. at 252.
49. In fact, the Court went on to state:
[1It would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater
consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial
judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
Id.
50. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
51. Id. at 909.
52. Id. at 910.
The three aggravating circumstances identified by the trial judge were 1) that the de-
fendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, 2) that the crime was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of kidnapping, and 3)
that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
Id.
53. Id.
54. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
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advisory sentence of life imprisonment." The judge independently
weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and found that
"notwithstanding the recommendation of the jury . . . a sentence of
death should be imposed in this case.' ' 6 Upon immediate appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court reversed the sentence of death because of a
sentencing error.
7
Upon remand, the trial judge once again overrode the jury's recom-
mended sentence of life and sentenced the defendant to death.' 8 Af-
firming Spaziano's sentence, the Florida Supreme Court held that a
trial judge's authority to sentence a defendant to death, despite a
jury's recommendation of life, was constitutionally valid.' 9 Moreover,
the court also held that the judge's decision to override the jury's rec-
ommendation met the "great weight" and "clear and convincing"
facts standard enunciated in Tedder.W°
The United States Supreme Court affirmed Spaziano's death sen-
tence and rejected his argument that the jury override provision vio-
lates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.61 More
importantly, however, the Court pronounced "the fundamental prem-
ise" that jury sentencing is not mandated in capital sentencing. 62 The
Court reasoned that "the purpose of the death penalty is not frus-
trated by, or inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of
the death penalty in individual cases is determined by a judge.''63 The
55. Id.at 451.
56. Id. at 452. The trial judge found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating cir-
cumstances " 'except, perhaps, the age [28] of the defendant.' " Id. The aggravating circum-
stances were that the homicide was especially heinous and atrocious and that the defendant had
prior felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Id.
57. Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (1981). The Florida Supreme Court found that the
trial judge had erred by relying on confidential information in a presentence investigation report
without giving prior notice to the defendant and an opportunity to respond. Id. at 1122.
58. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 453. Based upon a new presentence investigation report and hear-
ing at which the defendant presented no evidence, the trial judge reaffirmed his previous findings
as to the aggravating circumstances. Id.
59. Spaziano v. Florida, 433 So. 2d 508, 511-12 (Fla. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In
addition, the Florida Supreme Court found that "allowing the jury recommendation to be bind-
ing would violate Furman v. Georgia." Id. at 512.
60. Id. at 511 (citing Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975)). One justice dissented,
finding "no compelling reason to override [the jury's] recommendation." Id. at 512 (McDonald,
J., dissenting).
61. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457-67. The defendant argued that the jury override provision
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury,
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 457-58.
62. Id. at 458-64.
63. Id. at 462-63. The Court reasoned that simply because a jury may sentence does not
mean that they constitutionally must do so. Id. at 463 n.8. The Court also found unpersuasive
the fact that 30 out of 37 jurisdictions with a capital sentencing scheme vested capital sentencing
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Court thus specifically upheld the constitutionality of Florida's jury
override provision.6
Despite the Spaziano Court's holding, the debate over the appropri-
ateness of vesting the power of life or death in a single judge, rather
than a jury, has not subsided. At the time of the Spaziano decision,
only Florida, Alabama, and Indiana permitted a judge to override a
jury's recommended sentence; however, Delaware enacted a similar
provision in 1991. 61 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently upheld
Alabama's jury override provision in Harris v. Alabama.6 In Harris,
the defendant was convicted of capital murder for the solicited mur-
der of her deputy sheriff husband. 67 By a vote of seven to five, the
jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment." Under a sentenc-
ing scheme "much like that of Florida," the trial judge independently
weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposed
the death penalty.69
Although the Supreme Court found that Alabama's capital sentenc-
ing scheme was substantially similar to Florida's, it noted that the
statute nonetheless differed in one major respect: Florida's jury over-
ride provision is subject to the Tedder standard of deference to the
jury's recommendation, while Alabama law only requires the judge to
"consider" the jury's advisory sentence.70 Moreover, Alabama courts
had expressly declined to impose the Tedder standard upon Alaba-
ma's capital sentencing scheme.
7'
Notwithstanding the absence of the Tedder standard from
Alabama's jury override provision, the Supreme Court held that the
power in the jury, while only three of the remaining seven permitted a judge to override a jury's
recommendation of life. Id. at 463.
64. Id. at 465.
65. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1994). The Delaware Supreme Court held that
under Delaware's sentencing scheme the trial judge "bears the ultimate responsibility for imposi-
tion of the death sentence while the jury acts in an advisory capacity as the conscience of the
community." Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329, 335 (Del. 1993) (citation omitted).
66. 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995). "Alabama's capital sentencing scheme is unique. In Alabama,
unlike any other State in the Union, the trial judge has unbridled discretion to sentence the
defendant to death .... " Id. at 1037 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 1033.
68. Id.
69. Id. The trial judge found that the single aggravating circumstance of murder committed
for pecuniary gain outweighed the statutory mitigating factor of no prior criminal record and the
nonstatutory mitigating factor of being a hardworking, respected member of church and com-
munity. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Exparte Jones, 456 So. 2d 380, 382 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1062 (1985) (holding that Alabama is not constitutionally required to adopt the Tedder stan-
dard); Harris v. Alabama, 632 So. 2d 503, 538 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), aff'd, 632 So. 2d 543
(Ala'. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
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Alabama statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 72 The Court
noted its past approval "of the deference a judge must accord the jury
verdict under Florida law," but it found that this approval did not
"mean that the Tedder standard is constitutionally required.""71 Reaf-
firming its holding in Spaziano that the trial judge alone may constitu-
tionally impose the death sentence, the Court held that this legitimacy
was not "offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge
to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the
proper weight." 7 4 The Harris Court thus left little doubt that a trial
judge was not constitutionally required to afford a jury's advisory
sentence of life "great weight" prior to imposing a sentence of death.
C. Caldwell v. Mississippi and Divided Sentencing
Although the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
the constitutionality of Florida's capital sentencing scheme, the divi-
sion of the sentencing role in capital cases between judge and jury is
not wholly immune from constitutional scrutiny. In Caldwell v. Mis-
sissippi,7 the defendant was convicted of capital murder for shooting
and killing the owner of a small grocery store during a robbery. 76 The
Mississippi jury, which-unlike Florida juries-retains capital sen-
tencing authority, sentenced him to death."7 However, in response to a
defense effort to highlight the significance of the jury's decision, the
prosecution had attempted to minimize the jury's sense of the impor-
tance of its role by indicating that the jury's decision was not final;
rather, it was reviewable on appeal.78 The defendant's death sentence
was subsequently affirmed on direct appeal to the Mississippi Su-
preme Court. 79 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death
penalty by a jury that is led to believe that responsibility for the ap-
propriateness of the death sentence rests elsewhere. ° While this prohi-
bition does not directly implicate the ability of the trial judge to
override a jury's recommendation of life, it does directly apply to how
72. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1037.
73. Id. at 1035.
74. Id. at 1037.
75. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
76. Id. at 323-24.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 325.
79. Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 812 (Miss. 1983), rev'd, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). Al-
though the Mississippi Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the conviction, it upheld the valid-
ity of the sentence by a divided vote of four to four. Id. at 808.
80. Id. at 328-29.
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the state characterizes a jury's advisory role during the sentencing pro-
ceedings. In light of the advisory role of juries in the Florida scheme,
Caldwell prescribes how the state may characterize this dual role to a
jury.
8'
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has found Caldwell inap-
plicable to Florida's capital sentencing scheme; it reasoned that Cald-
well did not take into consideration an explicit statutory reference to
the advisory nature of the jury's role. 2 Moreover, the court noted
that, under the Mississippi statute, the Mississippi Supreme Court re-
views the jury's sentence, while, under the Florida statute, the trial
judge immediately reviews the jury's recommendation.83 Thus, the
Florida Supreme Court views the Mississippi capital sentencing
scheme at issue in Caldwell as unlike the one utilized in Florida be-
cause capital sentencing authority in Mississippi is vested in the jury,
not the trial judge.8
4
However, in Mann v. Dugger,3 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that Caldwell was indeed applicable to capital sentencing in
Florida. 6 The Mann court found that, despite the advisory nature of
the jury's role, Florida case law interpreting the death penalty statute
required a trial judge to give a jury's sentencing recommendation
"significant weight." 87 Consequently, the court reasoned that when a
Florida jury is misled into believing its role is unimportant, "a real
danger exists that a resulting death sentence will be based at least in
part on the determination of a decisionmaker that has been misled as
to the nature of its responsibility.""8 The court held that such a sen-
tence violates the Eighth Amendment's requirement of reliability in
capital sentencing.89 Furthermore, the Mann court, addressing the
Florida Supreme Court's refusal to grant Caldwell claims, stated that
it was not bound by a state court's application of federal constitu-
tional principles; rather, it looked to the state courts only for the na-
ture of the sentencing process and then independently decided how the
United States Constitution applied to claims under that process. 9°
Moreover, the court did not read the Florida Supreme Court's cases
81. See id.
82. Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 856 (Fla. 1988).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 844 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
86. Id. at 1454.
87. Id. at 1453-54.
88. Id. at 1455.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1454 n.10.
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as necessarily holding that a Caldwell violation could never occur in
Florida.9' In effect, then, Caldwell requires Florida judges to empha-
size both the seriousness which the jury should attach to its advisory
sentence and the great weight the judge will afford the jury's recom-
mendation .92
The application of Caldwell is a two-step process. 93 First, the re-
viewing court "must determine whether a prosecutor's comments to
the jury were such that they minimized the jury's sense of responsibil-
ity for determining the appropriateness of death." 94 The court meas-
ures this effect by specific reference to the role assigned to the jury
under state law. 95 Second, if the comments produce such an effect, the
court must then "determine whether the trial judge sufficiently cor-
rected the impression left by the prosecutor's comments." 9 The pro-
secutor's comments and the court's action or inaction violate the
Eighth Amendment only if the overall effect diminishes the jury's
sense of responsibility regarding its sentencing roleY In Florida, a
trial judge may preclude a Caldwell violation by accurately explaining
the respective functions of the judge and jury under Florida law "as
long as the significance of [the jury's] recommendation is adequately
stressed." 9 Thus, while the ultimate ethical judgment may be vested
in the judiciary, the Eighth Amendment prohibits downplaying the
importance of the advisory sentence to the jury.
III. ANALYSIS OF JURY OVERRIDE CRITICISM
A. Judicial Efficiency
The Florida Legislature created the jury override with the intention
of permitting the trial judge to override an "inflamed" jury's
91. Id.
92. See Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360, 367 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 (1986) ("It is
appropriate to stress to the jury the seriousness which it should attach to its recommendation
and, when the recommendation is received, to give it weight. To do otherwise would be contrary
to Caldwell v. Mississippi.").
93. See Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1456 (lth Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1071 (1989); Davis v. Singletary, 853 F. Supp. 1492, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
94. Mann, 844 F.2d at 1456.
95. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) ("To establish a Caldwell violation, a
defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role as-
signed to the jury by local law.").
96. Mann, 844 F.2d at 1456.
97. Id.
98. Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1475 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1071 (1989); see also Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851 (lth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 962 (1990) (finding no Caldwell violation where the defendant alleged the trial judge had
instructed the jury "that the appropriateness of his execution had already been decided by the
state legislature").
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recommendation of death." In reality, however, jury recommenda-
tions of life comprise the vast majority of override cases.'10 Between
1972 and 1988, one of every five death sentences in Florida involved
an override of a jury's life recommendation.' 0' This seems all the more
astounding when one realizes that Florida juries are considered to be
"among the most death-prone." 02
Yet this statistic is considerably startling if one considers that some
capital juries might well be timid about accepting responsibility for
making the ultimate ethical judgment. A recent study involving three-
to four-hour interviews with capital jurors in fourteen states-includ-
ing the jury override jurisdictions of Florida, Alabama, and Indiana-
indicated that capital juries "are confused about when the death pen-
alty is warranted and are reluctant to take personal responsibility for
their sentencing choices."'0 3 The study, known as the Capital Jury
Project (CJP), is an attempt to analyze how capital juries decide be-
tween life or death sentences.?° The intent of the CJP is to examine
the extent to which jurors' exercise of capital sentencing discretion is
still infected with, or now cured of, the arbitrariness which the
United States Supreme Court condemned in Furman v. Georgia, and
the extent to which the principal kinds of post-Furman guided
discretion statutes are curbing arbitrary decision-making-as the
Court said they would in Gregg v. Georgia and its companion
cases. 101
Although the CJP is not complete, the researchers' preliminary ex-
amination of the responses indicated that many capital jurors were
"unwilling to accept primary responsibility for their punishment
99. See Sue Carlton, Juries Could Lose Court Clout, ST. PETE. TnsaS, May 22, 1995, at B9.
100. See Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appel-
late Courts: A Comparison of Florida's System With Those of the Other States and the Federal
System, 45 FLA. L. REv. 21, 99 (1993).
101. Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 926. During this period, 113 of 526
death sentences were overrides of life recommendations. Id. However, in 1994, only 4 of the 47
death sentences were overrides of life recommendations. See Bill Tramples on Morality, supra
note 16, at A14.
102. See Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 925-26. For example, a sentence
of death in Florida requires only a majority vote of the jury. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1995). An
evenly divided jury vote is considered to be a recommendation of life imprisonment. See Patten
v. State, 467 So. 2d 975, 980 (Fla. 1985).
103. Study Finds Jurors Confused in Capital Trials, ST. Louis POST-DSPATCH, Mar. 26,
1995, at DIt.
104. William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1043 (1995).
105. Id.
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decisions." '06 According to the researchers, the results showed that,
"[u]nmistakably, jurors placed responsibility for the defendant's pun-
ishment elsewhere." 0 7 More specifically, in the jury override states of
Florida and Alabama, the preliminary results revealed that even fewer
jurors viewed themselves as primarily responsible for the capital de-
fendant's punishment. 08
Such findings suggest that an experienced trial judge, rather than a
reluctant jury, is better equipped to reflect community sentiment.
However, the Florida Supreme Court usually reverses judicial over-
rides of jury recommendations of life.' In 1991, the reversal rate for
jury overrides was an astonishing ninety-one percent." '0 Consequently,
one critic argues that because the death penalty workload consumes so
much of the court's time, eliminating override cases would reduce the
death penalty workload by twenty-one percent and the court's overall
workload by six to eight percent." ' This argument appears logical
from an administrative perspective if only because the court almost
always reverses override cases." 2 According to this view, then, the
simple interest of efficiency mandates abrogation of the jury override.
Yet assuming for the moment that the statistics are correct and that
Florida's capital scheme is inefficient, the question arises whether the
reliability and integrity of the system should be criticized on the basis
of administrative efficiency. The value of the override system rests in
what Governor Chiles describes as "a unique and delicate balance of a
jury's expression of community values and a judge's expertise regard-
ing application of the law.""' 3 From this perspective, an overall work-
load savings of six to eight percent becomes meaningless.
B. Federal and State Constitutionality
The leading opponent of the jury override on constitutional
grounds is Vermont Law School Professor Michael Mello, who is
106. Id. at 1044.
107. Id. at 1094. The study concluded that eight out of ten jurors placed the most responsi-
bility on the defendant or the law itself. Id.
108. Id. at 1095 n.233. Most capital jurors in jury override states viewed the judge as more
responsible than the jury for the defendant's sentence, but still less responsible than the defen-
dant and the law. Id. In contrast, virtually none of the capital jurors in the non-jury override
states viewed the judge as the most responsible for the defendant's sentence. Id.
109. Cope, supra note 100, at 100. From 1986 through 1992, the Florida Supreme Court
upheld only seven override sentences. See Gary Caldwell, Capital Crime Decisions: 1992 Survey
of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REv. 31, 64 n.261 (1992).
110. Cope, supra note 100, at 100.
111. Id. at 101.
112. Id. at 100. Cope argues that "[i]n reality the override cases have little actual effect on
the ultimate imposition of the death penalty, because the cases are so frequently reversed. As a
practical matter, most such defendants wind up with a life sentence." Id.
113. See Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 1-2.
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widely considered an "authority on the law of capital punishment."
4
Professor Mello argues that, notwithstanding express rulings to the
contrary, the Florida jury override violates both federal and state con-
stitutions." 5 Professor Mello asserts that Eighth Amendment concerns
of substantial unreliability in capital sentencing, concerns identified
by the Supreme Court in Caldwell, are equally applicable to Florida's
dual sentencing role involving trial level, rather than appellate level,
judicial review of the jury's recommendation. "1 6 Under this view, capi-
tal sentencing schemes that divide sentencing responsibility between a
judge and jury are inherently unconstitutional."
7
The Supreme Court has indeed warned that juries may be more
prone to render death sentences upon realizing that they are not the
final decisionmakers."5 Such downplaying of the jury's role creates
substantial unreliability in capital sentencing and thus implicates
Eighth Amendment concerns. 1 9 Professor Mello reasons that when a
jury is instructed of its advisory nature, it must necessarily face a di-
minished sentencing role in which it "is prone toward the same death-
bias" warned against in Caldwell. 2' Furthermore, Professor Mello ar-
gues, it makes no difference whether the jury is told the judge will
accord its advisory sentence "great weight" because the jury is left
with the impression that its recommendation will simply not be fol-
lowed.'2 ' This dual capital sentencing role is inherently unconstitu-
tional, Professor Mello reasons, because juries are likely to render a
recommendation of death; in reality, he writes, "[i]t is chimerical to
suppose that, under this regime, the jury's recommendation is
'merely' advisory."2
114. See Kilpatrick, supra note 10, at A17.
115. See Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 927-38; Mello, Taking Caldwell
Seriously, supra note 4, at 286-90.
116. Mello, Taking Caldwell Seriously, supra note 4, at 299-300. In Caldwell, the Supreme
Court identified four ways in which a Florida jury could be biased in favor of a death sentence:
1) the jury may not understand the nature of appellate level review, where its recommended
sentence and the judge's ultimate sentence are reviewed under a presumption of correctness; 2)
the jury may render a death sentence despite being unconvinced that death is appropriate merely
"in order to send a message of extreme disapproval"; 3) the jury may attempt to ensure reviewa-
bility by rendering a death sentence under the mistaken assumption that a life sentence is not
subject to reversal; and 4) jurors reluctant to impose death might minimize the importance of
their decision when told that the alternative decisionmaker is the state supreme court. Id. at 299
(citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-33 (1985)).
117. See id. at 286.
118. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330.
119. Id.
120. Mello, Taking Caldwell Seriously, supra note 4, at 303.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 310.
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Divided responsibility in capital sentencing, however, does not in-
herently violate the Eighth Amendment. As applied in Caldwell, the
Eighth Amendment merely prescribes how the state may inform the
jury of its role in capital sentencing.1 2 1 Caldwell prohibits the imposi-
tion of a death sentence by a jury which was misled by the state as to
its role in capital sentencing.124 In other words, the trial judge or pros-
ecutor cannot mislead a capital jury with respect to the responsibility
for determining the appropriateness of the sentence under state law.12
In Florida, this means simply that the jury should be informed of
both the divided sentencing role and the "great weight" the judge
must afford the jury's recommendation. 126
Professor Mello also asserts that the jury override violates the Flor-
ida Constitution. He reasons that because there was a state constitu-
tional right to jury sentencing in capital cases in 1845-the year in
which Florida adopted its first constitution- "it remains inviolate to-
day."' 27 In support of this contention, Professor Mello explains that
in 1845 the imposition of death was mandatory upon the conviction of
a capital offense; therefore, "capital sentencing was the jury's exclu-
sive domain" because the jury's consent, through a verdict of guilt,
"was a condition precedent" to a sentence of death.128 Accordingly, a
judge could not "increase" or override a jury's "recommendation"
of a lesser sentence through a "lesser conviction.' 
129
Ironically, this tenet also meant that the death penalty could only be
avoided through an acquittal. 130 To remedy this problem, the Florida
Legislature amended its capital sentencing scheme to make the imposi-
tion of death discretionary through a recommendation of "mercy." 3
Thus, for the century prior to Furman, "Florida law required the jury
to make the capital sentencing decision.'1 2 "[F]or the purposes of
state constitutional doctrine," Professor Mello concludes that this
process was the "functional equivalent of jury sentencing for capital
offenses.' 13a Prior to Furman, then, "a Florida jury's verdict for life
123. See supra text accompanying notes 75-98.
124. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29.
125. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989).
126. See Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1475 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
127. Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 964-70.
128. Id. at 964.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 969.
131. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
132. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 473 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
133. Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 968.
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was clearly and explicitly and unquestionably final."' 3 4 In other
words, a statute authorizing the trial judge to override a jury's capital
sentence today, presumably a life recommendation, violates the state
constitution.
However, this argument is more creative theory than legal sub-
stance. Florida law did not place capital sentencing in the hands of the
jury in 1845; rather, a sentence of death by the trial judge was manda-
tory upon the conviction of a capital crime. 35 Furthermore, the
Florida Constitution has never mandated that capital sentencing be
vested in a jury.13 6 Therefore, although Professor Mello posits that
Florida's death penalty system prior to Furman utilized the "func-
tional equivalent of jury sentencing in capital offenses,"' 3 7 there is
simply no basis for this assertion in the state constitution.
C. Public Policy
A final argument maintains that the Florida Legislature should re-
peal the override provision as a matter of public policy. 38 It is widely
accepted that retribution is the primary, if not the sole, justification
for the death penalty. 3 9 The death penalty is the "community's judg-
ment that no lesser sanction will provide an adequate response to the
defendant's outrageous affront to humanity."' 14 A jury verdict of
death, representing a cross section of the community, reflects the
"considered view of the community" on the "ultimate question of life
or death" ;14 it is a reflection of the community's conscience. 42
Thus, it would seem debatable whether the judge's experience or
expertise is a substitute for the ability of a jury to reflect community
sentiment when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Justice
Stevens, who dissented in both Harris and Spaziano, has argued that,
in the same fashion the Constitution prohibits judges from determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of an accused absent the defendant's
134. Id. at 969.
135. See Blitch v. Buchanan, 131 So. 151, 157 (Fla. 1930) ("Capital punishment . is pre-
scribed by statute [and] adjudged by the court.").
136. See id.
137. See Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 968.
138. See Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury, supra note 4, at 75.
139. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477-78 (1984) (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Supreme Court has concluded that deterrence cannot be used to support judicial as opposed to
jury discretion in capital cases because it is within the legislature's domain to establish on which
offenses the death penalty has a deterrent effect. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976).
140. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 1039.
142. Id.
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consent, twelve individual jurors are in a better position to represent
the judgment of the community as to whether a sentence of death or
life is appropriate in a particular case.' 43 Professor Mello surmises
that, "[i]n sum, experience or expertise is no substitute for the ability
of a jury to reflect community sentiment in its decision whether to
impose the death penalty." '"
However, both the United States Supreme Court and the Florida
Supreme Court have recognized the ability of an individual judge to
make this judgment. The Florida Supreme Court noted that "a trial
judge with experience in the facts of criminality possesses the requisite
knowledge to balance the facts of the case against the standard crimi-
nal activity which can only be developed by involvement with the
trials of numerous defendants."'' 45 The United States Supreme Court
observed "that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even
greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital
punishment."'" The Court reasoned that a trial judge is better able to
impose capital sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases
and thus provide substantial reliability in capital sentencing, because
the trial judge is simply more experienced than a jury.
47
D. A Likely Rationale for Jury Override Criticism
If the jury override can withstand scrutiny on constitutional
grounds as well as those of judicial efficiency and public policy, why
do opponents continue to criticize and question the utility of Florida's
capital sentencing scheme? Perhaps it is not the jury override that dis-
turbs critics, but the sentence itself.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court protects individuals
against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. However, it appears that the Court no longer
wants to regulate the implementation of capital punishment.' 41 As
long as a statutory scheme remains within the purview of Furman, the
Court is willing to give states a wide berth in capital sentencing
143. See id. at 1037-43; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury, supra note 4, at 47-51.
144. Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury, supra note 4, at 51.
145. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
146. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
147. Id.
148. See Bowers, supra note 104, at 1050-52. After Gregg v. Georgia, the Court began to
discount statutory guidelines and relax judicial scrutiny of capital sentencing discretion by 1)
removing statutory mitigation from the jury's consideration, 2) relaxing the guidance of statu-
tory aggravating considerations, 3) extending the scope of nonstatutory aggravating circum-
stances, and 4) no longer requiring that the jury's sentencing decision be monitored for
compliance with state statutory guidelines through a proportionality review. Id.
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methodology.149 The result in Florida effectively balances the jury's
reflection of the community conscience with the trial judge's ability to
provide consistent application of the death penalty. Rather than criti-
cize the ability of a trial judge to override a jury's recommendation of
life imprisonment, critics should recognize that Florida's scheme en-
sures substantial reliability in the imposition of death sentences.
Nonetheless, attacks on the constitutional legitimacy of the jury
override, as well as the morality of capital punishment, have proven
to be futile. 150 Thus, opponents of capital punishment can do little else
but attack the method through which a capital sentence is imposed.
The jury override is a perfect target for critics of the death penalty,
because it presents the possibility of the judicial arbitrariness warned
against in Furman. However, analysis of jury override criticism re-
veals that the override is a valuable tool in any capital sentencing
scheme because it, in fact, ensures reliability in capital sentencing.
Hence, jury override opponents simply use the override as a means of
attacking capital punishment in an attempt to limit its enforcement.
IV. Juiy OvEumE LEGISLATION
Despite the legitimacy of the jury override, critics nonetheless argue
that the Florida Legislature should simply do away with the override
provision. 5' Proposed solutions have included repealing the override,
mandating a unanimous verdict of death, and simply making a jury's
recommendation of life binding upon the trial judge.'52 Recent legisla-
tion affecting the jury override has come not from opponents of the
death penalty but from legislators seeking to streamline the death pen-
alty process. A bill recently passed by both the Florida House of Rep-
resentatives and Senate, but vetoed by Governor Chiles, " would have
abrogated the requirement that the judge give the jury's recommenda-
tion "great weight."'11 4 If the legislation had been signed into law, it
would have rendered the jury's recommendation "largely sym-
bolic"; " ' no longer would it have been "chimerical" to suppose that a
jury's recommendation is only advisory under Florida law. 1
5 6
149. Id.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49, 54-74.
151. Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury, supra note 4, at 44-45.
152. Id.; see also Cope, supra note 100, at 101 (suggesting that the "[a]doption of a unani-
mous jury requirement would automatically eliminate the override cases").
153. See Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 1.
154. See Fla. CS for HB 1319, § 3 (1995); see also Carlton, supra note 99.
155. Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 2.
156. See Mello, Taking Caldwell Seriously, supra note 4, at 310.
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A. Committee Substitute for House Bill 1319
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1319 was a "train bill" con-
taining a package of legislation dealing with capital sentencing and
collateral representation. The legislation was sponsored by Senator
Robert Wexler and Representative Ron Klein, allegedly at the urging
of Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth. 5 7 It combined the orig-
inal House Bill 1319 with a portion of House Bill 2078, which dealt
with the scope of collateral representation in capital cases by placing a
two-year limit on filing for collateral representation, and with House
Bill 89, which authorized additional aggravating circumstances."'
Most importantly, however, this package of legislation provided for
a nonbinding advisory sentence by the jury." 9 Committee Substitute
for House Bill 1319 would have deleted the statutory reference to the
"advisory sentence" offered by the jury and instead would have speci-
fied that the jury's advisory recommendation is nonbinding. 160 Thus,
the legislation would have effectively abrogated the Tedder standard,
recasting the role of the jury's advisory recommendation as "solely
for the purpose of apprising the trial judge and appellate court of the
jury's reaction to the evidence of aggravation and mitigation as a mat-
ter of information.' 6' The amendment would have authorized the
trial judge to "overrule the jury in almost any circumstance' '1 62 be-
cause, as Governor Chiles noted in his veto, the advisory sentence
"would carry virtually no weight at all." 63
It appears that the Florida Legislature interpreted the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Harris v. Alabama-" as a license to get
tough on crime. In Harris, the Supreme Court noted Florida's Tedder
standard with approval but held that it was not mandatory in order to
bring a capital sentencing scheme into conformity with Eighth
157. See Exec. Office of the Gov., Office of Planning and Budgeting, Legislative Bill Analy-
sis, CS for HB 1319 (May 16, 1995) (on file with Exec. Office of the Gov., Office of Legis. Aff.)
[hereinafter Legislative Bill Analysis]; Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for HB 1319 (1995)
Staff Analysis 6 (final Apr. 11, 1995) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Staff Analysis]; see also
Bill Tramples on Morality, supra note 16, at At4.
158. Legislative Bill Analysis, supra note 157.
159. Fla. CS for HB 1319, § 3 (1995); see also Legislative Bill Analysis, supra note 157, at 2;
Staff Analysis, supra note 157, at 7.
160. Fla. CS for HB 1319, § 3 (1995); see also Staff Analysis, supra note 157, at 7.
161. Fla. CS for HB 1319, § 3 (1995) (emphasis added).
162. Michael Griffin, Chiles Lets Prison Bill Become Law; The Next Fight: How To Pay for
the New Prisons and Guards-Through Bonds or Tax Revenues, ORLANDO SENT., June 15,
1995, at Cl.
163. Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 2.
164. 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
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Amendment dictates. 65 Committee Substitute for House Bill 1319 was
intended to eradicate Tedder because, as Deputy Attorney General Pe-
ter Antonacci argued, "[tihe [Florida] Supreme Court in Tedder com-
pletely redid the [1972] legislative intent to say that the jury's role was
central as opposed to advisory.' '166
Critics of the jury override certainly must have been appalled at the
Legislature's nearly successful attempt to relegate the jury's advisory
sentence to the status of a nonbinding advisory recommendation. Ac-
cording to Senate testimony, Governor Chiles' office received sugges-
tions from trial judges that the jury override should be abolished.
67
The Governor himself noted that he "would support a law which held
that a jury recommendation of imprisonment would not be subject to
override by the judge."
68
The strongest argument against the jury override is that twelve indi-
vidual jurors are better suited to reflect the community's sentiment
because the decision is simply too important to be left in the hands of
a single government official. 69 This begs the question: why would the
Florida Legislature want to make jurors wrangle with a life or death
decision if it would count for nothing at all?
B. The Potential Impact of Committee Substitute
for House Bill 1319
Perhaps the answer can be found by analyzing the impact this legis-
lation would have had on the previously identified criticisms of the
jury override. 70 From an administrative perspective, the legislation
might well have achieved the desired result of judicial efficiency.'
7'
However, while Committee Substitute for House Bill 1319 would have
streamlined the appellate process, it would have almost certainly cre-
ated immediate short-term constitutional litigation regarding its legiti-
macy.17 2 Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
already upheld the validity of jury override schemes without the
165. Id. at 1035.
166. Eroding the Role of Juries, ST. PETE. Tnams, Apr. 22, 1995, at A16 [hereinafter Eroding
the Role of Juries].
167. Legislative Bill Analysis, supra note 157, at 4. Ironically, Committee Substitute for
House Bill 1319 was inconsistent with these suggestions. Id.
168. Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis added).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 99-147.
171. The Florida Attorney General's Office believed that the bill would have significantly
reduced the number of death row appeal cases; however, the Capital Collateral Representative
disagreed. See Legislative Bill Analysis, supra note 157, at 5.
172. Governor Chiles declared that the bill would increase "the already untenable time that
death cases languish in court." Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 1.
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Tedder "great weight" and "clear and convincing" facts standard of
deference, 73 the bill represented such a basic change in Florida's capi-
tal sentencing scheme that it would surely have engendered some con-
stitutional litigation.174 As Governor Chiles said in his veto, "Simply
put, Florida's entire death penalty process would be subject to consti-
tutional attack due to these fundamental changes and years of uncer-
tainty would be the result."'171 However, the Governor also indicated
that he supported the bill's other provisions, which he said would help
"streamline" Florida's death penalty process. 76 Thus, while not elimi-
nating override litigation, it would appear that the proposed legisla-
tion would have achieved some positive impact on judicial efficiency.
From a constitutional standpoint, however, Committee Substitute,
for House Bill 1319 would apparently have had little impact. The pro-
posed capital sentencing scheme would have withstood Eighth
Amendment scrutiny mandated by Caldwell, provided that the jury
was not led to believe that it possessed a diminished role in accordance
with local law.'" Hence, the potential impact of Caldwell claims aris-
ing in capital sentencing in Florida would have been negligible if the
jury's role were truly reduced to being only advisory. Judges and pro-
secutors would no longer have had to tread the fine line between the
dual sentencing function of the judge and jury in Florida's capital sen-
tencing scheme. However, the argument that a statute vesting the trial
judge with the power to impose capital sentencing violates the Florida
Constitution would have persisted. Nevertheless, this argument, al-
though certainly viable, would not likely have been adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court.
17
Finally, the strongest argument against the jury override, public
policy, would also have persisted despite the legislation. In fact, such
criticism would have intensified. Public policy opponents of the over-
ride repeatedly argue that twelve jurors, not a single judge, are better
suited to reflect the community conscience and make the ultimate ethi-
cal judgment.179 These critics suggest repealing the override. Governor
Chiles, The Florida Bar, Florida's 1991 Criminal Justice Task Force
173. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1035-37 (1995).
174. See Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 1. Both proponents and opponents of the bill
agreed that the provision would have "create[d] initial litigation for that offender to whom it
first applie[d]," because the Florida Supreme Court would "need to reevaluate the 'great weight'
standard it has assigned to the jury's 'advisory sentence.' " Legislative Bill Analysis, supra note
157, at 4.
175. Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 1.
176. Id. at 2.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
179. See, e.g., Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury, supra note 4, at 47-51.
1995]
486 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:463
on Sentencing, and, it would seem, twenty-nine of the thirty-seven
states with the death penalty agree.' 80 However, instead of following
this lead, Florida legislators would have made it easier for the trial
judge to ignore the jury's recommendation rather than afford it
"great weight." As one editorial writer pointed out, in their "haste to
'get tough' on death penalty cases, Florida lawmakers went over-
board.""'' Thus, it is readily apparent that the strongest argument
against both the jury override and Committee Substitute for House
Bill 1319 is that it is not wise public policy to vest the power to make
the ultimate ethical judgment in a trial judge rather than the jury.
Yet in one sense Florida does indeed trust the jury to assess a capi-
tal defendant's moral guilt. For more than two decades, via the Ted-
der "great weight" and "clear and convincing" facts standard, the
Florida Supreme Court has required trial judges to afford deference
to the jury's reflection of community values.182 Governor Chiles bol-
stered the Tedder standard when he vetoed Committee Substitute for
House Bill 1319. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has re-
peatedly noted that Florida's capital sentencing scheme, with its Ted-
der standard, offers the substantial reliability mandated by the Eighth
Amendment. 8 3 Thus, Florida's trifurcated sentencing scheme provides
capital defendants, as well as the community, substantial reliability in
the capital sentencing process by acting as a check against impas-
sioned or misguided jurors and overzealous trial judges. Governor
Chiles' assessment bears repeating: "The present law represents a
unique and delicate balance of a jury's expression of community val-
ues and a judge's expertise regarding application of the law."' l 4
Critics of Governor Chiles' veto are perhaps missing a vital point.
As one commentator suggested, the 1972 Florida Legislature gave the
trial judge, rather than the jury, the duty to see that the death penalty
is imposed fairly, and the Tedder standard "remains an essential tool
to that end."' 8 This statement at once recognizes both the trial
judge's ability as an experienced jurist to fulfill this duty and the def-
erence the trial judge should afford the jury's recommendation as a
180. Bill Diminishes Juries'Influence, FT. LAUD. SUN-SENT., June 7, 1995, at 10A.
181. Bill Tramples on Morality, supra note 16, at A14. In his veto, Governor Chiles re-
marked that the bill's sponsors "have made a good faith effort to address the most difficult and
complex problem of deciding which convicted criminal should be put to death. However, the
problems I have noted outweigh any improvements they, or I, might find in the bill." Gover-
nor's Veto, supra note 18, at 2.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 54-74.
184. Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 1-2.
185. Eroding the Role of Juries, supra note 166.
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matter of public policy. The Tedder standard is, in Florida, an essen-
tial part of the reasonableness and control the Supreme Court found
missing in Furman.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has, in effect, "deregulated
death";' 8 6 in other words, it is no longer inclined to regulate how and
when a capital defendant is executed. Thus, the Court affords the sov-
ereign states wide latitude in dictating this methodology, provided that
the statutory schemes comply with the mandates of Furman. 18 Florida
took the lead in this area by adopting a trifurcated sentencing scheme
that constitutes a delicate balance between the jury's reflection of the
community's conscience and the trial judge's ability to ensure consis-
tent application of the death penalty. Despite constant criticism of the
jury override provision, it is an effective method of making this judg-
ment and has repeatedly been approved by the United States Supreme
Court as ensuring substantial reliability in capital sentencing.'
The Florida Legislature, however, recently attempted to abrogate
the Tedder "great weight" and "clear and convincing" facts standard
by making the jury's recommendation truly advisory. 1 9 Fortunately,
Governor Chiles recognized the value of Florida's present sentencing
scheme insofar as it assures capital defendants, as well as the commu-
nity, that the death penalty will not be imposed arbitrarily or in a
discriminatory manner. Although Committee Substitute for House
Bill 1319 contained several provisions which might indeed have
streamlined the death penalty process, the Florida Supreme Court's
Tedder standard is an integral and necessary part of Florida's death
penalty law.
In making the decision to veto Committee Substitute for House Bill
1319, Governor Lawton Chiles said that he "trusts jurors."'19 One
should trust jurors, as community representatives, to make the ulti-
mate ethical judgment. Rather than being burdensome, however, it is
a genuine benefit to have a system in which the jury's assessment of
the community's conscience is not only afforded "great weight" but is
also held in check by the trial judge-an expert in applying the law.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
187. See Mello, Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4, at 932.
188. Viewed in this light, and notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v.
Alabama, perhaps the Alabama Supreme Court should reconsider its refusal to adopt the Tedder
standard in its capital sentencing scheme.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 157-66.
190. Governor's Veto, supra note 18, at 2.
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Ultimately, even the trial judge's decision is subject to review for arbi-
trariness and discrimination by the Florida Supreme Court. As to the
question of whether we should trust either a single trial judge or
twelve individual jurors to make the ultimate ethical judgment, the
answer is both.
